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CHANGING THE BATHWATER AND KEEPING THE BABY:1
EXPLORING NEW WAYS OF EVALUATING INTENT IN
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCRIMINATION CASES

BROWNE C. LEWIS*

ABSTRACT
Minorities in the United States live in areas that are heavily polluted. In
addition to dealing with the pollution generated by their neighborhoods,
minorities often are exposed to environmental hazards that provide services
for the entire community. The problem of the disproportionate placement of
environmental hazards in minority communities is well documented. A
primary cause of the inequitable distribution of environmental hazards in this
country is environmental discrimination based on class and race.
Persons combating environmental discrimination have attempted to get
relief relying upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Unfortunately, plaintiffs in environmental discrimination cases have hit a brick
wall—the requirement that they prove the decision to place the environmental
hazard in their neighborhood was motivated by an intent to discriminate on the
part of the decision-makers. In response, advocates have proposed replacing
intent as the evidentiary requirement in Equal Protection Cases. If properly
applied, the intent requirement is a perfectly viable evidentiary method.
Therefore, I propose keeping the intent requirement and changing the manner
1. This title is a twist on the proverb: “Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater.” There
is some controversy surrounding the origin of the proverb. The following is one view:
Baths equaled a big tub filled with hot water. The man of the house had the privilege of
the nice clean water, then all the other sons and men, then the women and finally the
children. Last of all the babies. By then the water was so dirty you could actually lose
someone in it. Hence the saying, “Don’t throw the baby out with the bath water.”
More Eccentricities of the English Language, http://www.wordskit.com/language/legends/
bathwater.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
* Assistant Professor, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, B.A., Grambling State
University, J.D., University of Minnesota, L.L.M., Energy & Environmental Law, University of
Houston, M.P.A., Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. I would like to thank the
following persons for their assistance in the preparation of this article: Professor Pamela Wilkins,
Professor Robin Magee, Professor Imani Perry, Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Professor
Camille Nelson, Professor Bernie D. Jones, Dean Mark Gordon, Urooj Usman, and Melodee
Henderson.
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in which the courts determine if the plaintiffs have satisfied the requirement.
The courts should presume intent if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that
the decision to place the environmental hazard in their neighborhood was
unreasonable.
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INTRODUCTION
Given the United States’ legacy of discriminatory activity, in Professor
Robert D. Bullard’s2 opinion, it is not surprising that the country’s
environmental laws, regulations, and policies have not been consistently
applied across all sectors of the populace. For instance, low-income families
and minorities are forced to tolerate an unequal burden of the country’s
“pollution problems.” Consequently, persons in those communities are
exposed to the public health threats that accompany environmental hazards.3
Professor Bullard was one of the first persons to write about the rampant
environmental discrimination in the United States. According to Professor
Bullard, the current environmental protection regime is designed to provide
greater benefits and protection for white persons living in middle- and upperincome communities while allocating costs to low-income and minority
persons.4 Therefore, Professor Bullard and others advocate reconstructing the
current environmental protection regime to address the issue of environmental
discrimination.5
For years, governmental decision-makers have contributed to the
disproportionate placement of environmental hazards in low-income6 and

2. Bullard is one of the leading experts in the field of environmental justice. He was one of
the planners of the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit.
3. Robert D. Bullard, Introduction to UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, at xv, vv (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994) [hereinafter UNEQUAL
PROTECTION].
4. Id. at xv–xvi.
5. Bullard states,
[T]he dominant environmental protection paradigm (1) institutionalizes unequal
enforcement; (2) trades human health for profit; (3) places the burden of proof on the
“victims,” not on the polluting industry; (4) legitimates human exposure to harmful
chemicals, pesticides, and hazardous substances; (5) promotes “risky” technologies, such
as incinerators; (6) exploits the vulnerability of economically and politically
disenfranchised communities; (7) subsidizes ecological destruction; (8) creates an
industry around risk assessment; (9) delays cleanup actions; and (10) fails to develop
pollution prevention as the overarching and dominant strategy.
Id. at xvi.
6. When dealing with environmental justice issues, advocates have identified the lowincome population in an affected area by using the annual statistical poverty thresholds from the
Bureau of the Census’s Current Population Reports, Series P-60 on Income and Poverty. See
COUNCIL ON ENVT. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 25 (1997), available at
http://www.wct.doc.gov/env_justice/pdf/ justice.pdf [hereinafter CEQ GUIDANCE]. However, for
the purpose of clarity, I am using the term as defined in the housing area. A “low-income family”
is a family that has income that does not exceed 80 percent of the median income for the area
where the family resides. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(b)(2) (2000).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

472

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:469

minority7 communities.8 Environmental discrimination based upon class and
race is one possible cause of the unequal distribution of environmental hazards.
The recognition that low-income and minority persons have been unequally
treated in the environmental protection arena led to the development of the
environmental justice movement.9 “Environmental justice” is the term used to
refer to the steps that have been taken to remedy environmental
discrimination.10 Persons discussing the problem of the disproportionate
placement of environmental hazards in low-income and minority
neighborhoods have also used the terms “environmental racism”11 and
7. In the environmental justice arena, the term “minority” is used to refer to the following
four major racial and ethnic groups: (1) Blacks, (2) American Indians and Alaska Natives, (3)
Asians and Pacific Islanders, and (4) Hispanics. CEQ GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 25. In the
context of this Article, “minority populations” broadly refers to all persons except non-Hispanic
whites.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-84, HAZARDOUS AND
NONHAZARDOUS WASTE: DEMOGRAPHICS OF PEOPLE LIVING NEAR WASTE FACILITIES 17 n.2
(June 1995), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/rc95084.pdf [hereinafter
GAO/RCED-95-84].
8. In this Article, I use the term “environmental hazards” to refer to projects that pollute the
environment and those that have the potential to pollute.
9. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines environmental
justice as:
The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color,
national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment means that
no group of people, including racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group should bear a
disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from
industrial, municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, local,
and tribal programs and policies.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
CONCERNS IN EPA’S NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSES § 1.1.1 (Apr. 1998), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/ej/ej_guidance_nepa_epa0498.pdf [hereinafter
EPA GUIDANCE]; see also Envtl. Prot. Agency, Evironmental Justice, http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/environmental justice (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
10. Major Willie A. Gunn, From the Landfill to the Other Side of the Tracks: Developing
Empowerment Strategies to Alleviate Environmental Injustice, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1227, 1235
(1996) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1994)).
11. The term “environmental racism” was invented by Dr. Benjamin Chavis, Jr. in 1982. He
defined the term as:
racial discrimination in environmental policy[-]making and the unequal enforcement of
environmental laws and regulations. It is the deliberate targeting of people of color
communities for toxic waste facilities and the official sanctioning of a life threatening
presence of poisons and pollutants in people of color communities. It is also manifested
in the history of excluding people of color from the leadership of the environmental
movement.
Robert M. Frye, Environmental Injustice: The Failure of American Civil Rights and
Environmental Law to Provide Equal Protection from Pollution, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
53, 56 (1993) (quoting Environmental Racism: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Civil
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“environmental equity.”12
In this Article, the term “environmental
discrimination” is used to refer to the practice of disproportionately locating
environmental hazards in low-income and minority communities. The core
premise of this Article focuses on the use of the Equal Protection Clause to
combat environmental discrimination. Thus, I will be dealing exclusively with
the location of environmental hazards in minority communities.
After an environmental hazard has been placed in a minority community,
the residents might not feel the negative impact for several years. Whenever
the members of a community experience adverse consequences because of an
environmental hazard, persons seeking to help them typically have three main
objectives. The first goal is to have the environmental hazard put out of
operation.13 The second goal is to receive compensation for persons who have
been injured by the environmental hazard.14 The final goal is to prevent new
environmental hazards from being placed in and near the impacted
community.15 When the persons affected are minorities, one of the primary
tools advocates have attempted to use to achieve their goals is the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.16
A substantial amount of evidence shows that federal, state, and local
governmental decision-makers have permitted a disproportionate number of
environmental hazards, including hazardous waste incinerators and harmful

and Constitutional Rights, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 3, 1993) (testimony of Dr. Benjamin F.
Chavis, Jr., Executive Director, United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice); see also
Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Foreword to CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES
FROM THE GRASSROOTS 3, 3 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) [hereinafter GRASSROOTS].
12. The term “environmental equity” has been used by the EPA to refer to “the distribution
and effects of environmental problems and the policies and processes to reduce differences in
who bears environmental risks.” ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING
RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 2 (1992), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
publications/ej/reducing_risk_com_vol1.pdf [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY]. According
to its workgroup report, the EPA used the term because “it most readily lends itself to scientific
risk analysis.” Id.
13. See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 49 (1990) (discussing how members of a predominantly minority community organized
to have a lead smelter put out of operation).
14. Id. at 44 (discussing how minority residents organized to halt the construction of a
landfill in their subdivision).
15. Kathy Seward Northern, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental
Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 535 (1997); see also Kirsten H. Engel,
Brownfield Initiatives and Environmental Justice: Second-Class Cleanups or Market-Based
Equity?, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 317, 329 (1997–1998) (discussing attempts by
persons combating environmental discrimination to get “legislative moratoriums” passed to
prevent the placement of additional environmental hazards in minority communities that are
already over-saturated with pollution-generating activities).
16. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
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industrial processes, to be placed in minority communities.17 Governmental
authorities also have been remiss in enforcing environmental regulations in
those communities.18 As a consequence of this apparent unequal treatment
under the law, advocates have attempted to use the Equal Protection Clause to
challenge the placement of environmental hazards in minority communities on
the ground that the government decision-maker was racially discriminatory in
approving the activity.19
Environmental discrimination cases have been largely unsuccessful
because plaintiffs have been unable to prove discriminatory intent on the part
of the decision-maker.20 In the absence of negligence, persons usually are only
legally accountable for their intentional actions. Hence, discriminatory intent
should not be replaced as the standard of proof in environmental discrimination
cases. Nonetheless, fairness dictates that the manner in which the courts
evaluate whether or not the intent requirement has been met should be
modified. Under the current system, even after proving disparate impact, in
order to satisfy the intent requirement, a plaintiff must prove that the decisionmaker’s action was motivated by an intent to discriminate.21Instead of
mandatory proof of conscious, purposeful discriminatory intent, the court
should analyze the facts to see if there is a valid reason to presume
discriminatory intent on the part of the decision-maker.
This paper is divided into four parts. Part one consists of a general
overview of the problem of environmental discrimination. Part two gives a
brief discussion of relevant Equal Protection jurisprudence. The section begins
with a summary of general Equal Protection law. Then, the section analyzes
the primary cases that established the foundation of modern-day Equal
Protection doctrine. Part three examines the current application of the intent
requirement in environmental discrimination cases. To that end, the section
reviews the outcome of three of the early environmental discrimination cases,
and speculates about the components that are necessary to prepare a successful
Equal Protection challenge in the environmental arena. Part four consists of an
extensive analysis of the debate over the validity of the intent requirement.
The section starts by encapsulating a few of the proposed theories put forth to
replace or modify the intent requirement. The section ends with my suggestion
for refining the current application of the intent standard to make the process
fairer to the plaintiffs in environmental discrimination cases.
17. Northern, supra note 15, at 535.
18. Id.
19. M. Patrice Benford, Note, Life, Liberty & the Pursuit of Clean Air: Fight for
Environmental Equality, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 275 (1995); see also R.I.S.E., Inc. v.
Kay, 768 F. Supp 1144, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1991).
20. See Part II, infra, for a discussion of the three key environmental discrimination cases
that proves this assertion.
21. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1149.
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I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
The problem of environmental discrimination has been documented in
several studies and discussed in numerous books and law review articles.
Therefore, I only will briefly highlight the information contained in those
sources.
After a protest by black residents in Warren County, North Carolina,22 the
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) sponsored a study to
determine the extent of environmental discrimination in America.23 As a result
of its observations, the GAO concluded that a correlation existed between the
decisions to place hazardous waste landfills in an area and the race and income
level of the people living in the area.24
Governmental agencies were not the only organizations concerned about
the adverse impact environmental hazards had on low-income and minority
persons. In 1987, the United Church of Christ (UCC) did its own analysis of
the problem.25After analyzing all of the data, the UCC determined that race,
not socioeconomic status, accounted for the fact that certain communities in
the United States had more hazardous waste facilities than other
communities.26
22. In 1982, a coalition of civil rights groups protested the placement of a landfill in a black
county. See Gunn, supra note 10, at 1228 (citing Marcia Coyle, When Movements Coalesce,
NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S10.)
23. As a part of the information-gathering process, GAO staff met with an official of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference to discuss racial issues surrounding selection of the
Warren County PCB landfill site. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 2 (1983) [hereinafter GAO/RCED-83-168]. The
participants in the study examined landfills in the eight states that compose EPA’s Region IV
(Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Tennessee). Id.
24. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 12, § 2.2.1 (citing GAO/RCED-83-168, supra
note 23). The persons conducting the study discovered that three of the four commercial
hazardous waste facilities in the region were in predominately African American communities
and the fourth was in a low-income community. GAO/RCED-83-168, supra note 23, at 1.
Furthermore, at least twenty-six percent of the population living in all four communities had
incomes below the poverty level. Id. African Americans made up the majority of the persons
living in poverty. Id.
25. As a part of the study, the UCC examined RCRA commercial hazardous waste facilities
across the country. GAO/RCED-95-84, supra note 7, at 14 (citing COMM’N FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES
WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987) [hereinafter UCC STUDY]); see also BULLARD, supra
note 13, at 17. The UCC study was more comprehensive than the GAO report because the
analysts focused on the entire United States. See Frye, supra note 11, at 59.
26. According to the UCC’s report, communities with a single hazardous waste facility had
twice as many people of color as did communities without such a facility. UCC STUDY, supra
note 25, at xiii, cited in Northern, supra note 15, at 500. In addition, the study reported that

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

476

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:469

The GAO and UCC reports spawned considerable debate about the
inequitable distribution of environmental hazards. For example, in 1990, at a
conference held at the University of Michigan, participants presented various
reports studying the distribution of environmental hazards by race and
income.27 Afterwards, the conference members gave the information compiled
at the conference to then-EPA Administrator William Reilly and urged the
agency to conduct an internal investigation into the matter.28
In 1992, a study published by the National Law Journal (NLJ) reported that
the EPA consistently was negligent in its enforcement efforts in low-income
and minority communities.29 The NLJ study was based upon findings from an
eight-month investigation that focused on the connection between race and
socioeconomic status and the enforcement of environmental law.30 The NLJ
reviewed every environmental lawsuit filed in the seven years preceding the
study and every residential toxic waste site included in the Superfund
program.31
Like any form of discrimination, environmental discrimination has been
acknowledged as a major problem.32 Legal scholars and persons seeking to
combat environmental discrimination have suggested different solutions to the
problem.33 The next part of the paper deals with the utility of the Equal
communities with two or more facilities had more than three times the population of people of
color as communities without such sites. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 12, § 2.2.1.
27. Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class As
Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 923 (1992); see
also Joseph Ursic, Note, Finding a Remedy for Environmental Justice: Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
Fill in a Title VI Gap, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 499 (2002).
28. Mohai & Bryant, supra note 27, at 499.
29. See Claire L. Hasler, Comment, The Proposed Environmental Justice Act: “I Have a
(Green) Dream,” 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 417, 425–427 (1994) (discussing findings of NLJ
study); see also Robert B. Wiygul & Sharon Carr Harrington, Environmental Justice in Rural
Communities: Part One: RCRA, Communities, and Environmental Justice, 96 W. VA. L. REV.
405, 419 (1993–1994).
30. Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on
the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 18 (1995).
31. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, The Federal Government, in Its Cleanup of
Hazardous Sites and Its Pursuit of Polluters, Favors White Communities over Minority
Communities Under Environmental Laws Meant to Provide Equal Protection for All Citizens, A
National Law Journal Investigation Has Found, 15 NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2.
32. Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws
and “Justice,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 222 (1997); see also Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of
Environmental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement, in GRASSROOTS, supra note 11,
at 15–39; C.J. TIMMONS ROBERTS & MELISSA M. TOFFOLON-WEISS, CHRONICLES FROM THE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FRONTLINE 3–28 (2001); Terence J. Centner et al., Environmental
Justice and Toxic Releases: Establishing Evidence of Discriminatory Effect Based on Race and
Not Income, 3 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 120 (1996).
33. See Ursic, supra note 27, at 497; see also James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less
Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13
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Protection Clause as a legal vehicle for addressing environmental
discrimination.
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
A.

Brief Overview of Relevant Equal Protection Jurisprudence

The Fourteenth Amendment specifically empowers the federal government
to act against discriminatory government actions at the state and local level,
particularly those made on the basis of race.34 According to the Equal
Protection Clause, no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”35 “[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through
duly constituted agents.”36 The United States Supreme Court has concluded
that the function of the Equal Protection Clause is to ensure that the
government treats “all persons similarly situated” the same.37
An equal protection claim essentially has two elements: (1) the plaintiff
was treated differently from other similarly situated persons, and (2) this
different treatment was motivated by one of the following: (a) an intent to
discriminate on the basis of a characteristic, such as race or religion; (b) an
intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution; or (c) a bad faith intent to injure a person.38 In an equal
protection case, after the plaintiff shows that a facially neutral statute has a
disproportionate impact on him, he must prove that the governmental decisionmaker responsible for the act causing the adverse impact was motivated by an
invidious discriminatory purpose.39

STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125 (1994); Benford, supra note 19, at 284–289 (advocating the use of Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631, to combat
environmental discrimination).
34. Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 391 (D. Mass.
2003).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Bluitt v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 236 F. Supp.
2d 703, 734 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
36. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co.
v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)).
37. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (stating that
“[t]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”).
38. See Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting LeClair v.
Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 609–10 (2d Cir. 1980)).
39. See United States v. Hare, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 991 (D. Neb. 2004).
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The courts have acknowledged intentional discrimination in three contexts.
First, courts have been willing to find discriminatory intent in those cases
where a law or policy has expressly categorized citizens on the basis of race.40
In addition, courts have found discriminatory intent in situations where a
facially neutral law or policy has been applied differently to citizens because of
their race.41 Finally, courts have noted that discriminatory intent may exist
when a facially neutral law or policy, that has been applied evenhandedly, was
motivated by discriminatory intent and had a racially discriminatory impact.42
The Supreme Court has structured its equal protection analysis by
establishing the following three levels of review for challenges to governmentsupported actions: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.43
“When a legislative enactment has been challenged on equal protection
grounds, one standard of review is rational basis review, which requires that
the law be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”44 The
rational basis test is the lowest level of review. Thus, governmental decisions
analyzed under the rational basis test are almost always upheld. The rational
basis test is applied to cases where the challenged activity did not impact a
person in a protected class or undermine a fundamental right.45
The Supreme Court has also developed an intermediate level of scrutiny
that lies “[b]etween [the] extremes of rational basis review and strict
scrutiny . . . .”46 Typically, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny when it has
to review laws that impact quasi-suspect classifications such as gender or
age.47 When a classification affects “suspect classes” of persons or burdens a
fundamental right, “strict scrutiny” applies and a compelling governmental
interest must be shown to justify the classification.48Strict scrutiny is such a
high standard that its application usually results in a victory for the plaintiff.
The standard is applied whenever a member of a suspect class can prove
discriminatory intent.49 Therefore, in order to have any level of success,
40. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999).
41. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367–68 (1886).
42. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977).
43. Goulart v. Meadows, 220 F. Supp. 2d 494, 501 (D. Md. 2002); see also Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and
Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 633–634 (2003).
44. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 174–75 (2d Cir. 2003).
45. See id.; Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2000).
46. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
47. See United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see also
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
48. United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (2005).
49. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995).
[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to “smoke out” illegitimate uses of race by assuring that
[a state actor] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.
The test also ensures that the means chosen “fit” this compelling goal so closely that there
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environmental discrimination plaintiffs must prove that decisions to place
environmental hazards in their communities were motivated by racial
considerations. To meet their burden of proof, those plaintiffs must have
access to quality information.50
B.

Seminal Equal Protection Cases

Equal Protection litigation is controlled by two seminal Supreme Court
decisions: Washington v. Davis,51 and Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.52
In Davis, Harley and Sellers, two black men, unsuccessfully applied to
become police officers in Washington, D.C.53 Their applications were rejected
because they did not pass a written personnel test.54 Harley and Sellers filed a
lawsuit alleging that the police department’s recruiting procedures, including
the written personnel test, were racially discriminatory in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.55 Instead of claiming intentional
discrimination, the plaintiffs contended that the written test bore no
relationship to job performance and had a discriminatory effect of screening
out black applicants.56
The district court made three key conclusions. The first two conclusions
the court made were that the number of blacks on the police force was not
proportionate to the racial content of the city and that more blacks flunked the
test than white applicants.57 The court also determined that the police
department did not validate the test to gauge if it was a reliable indicator of job
performance.58 Nonetheless, the district court refused to find intentional
discrimination on the part of the police department and granted the
department’s summary judgment motion.59
In reaching its decision, the district court was influenced by the fact that
(1) 44% of the new police recruits were blacks, a percentage that was
proportionate to the number of blacks on the police force and equal to the
number of 20- to 29-year-old blacks located in the recruiting area; (2) the

is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype.
Id. (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)) (emphasis added).
50. The value of information will be discussed in a later section.
51. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
52. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
53. Davis, 426 U.S. at 232–33.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 235.
57. Id.
58. Davis, 426 U.S. at 235.
59. Id.
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police department had affirmatively recruited blacks and had many pass the
test, but then fail to report for duty; and (3) the test was a useful indicator of
training school performance and was not designed to, and did not, discriminate
against otherwise qualified blacks.60
In an opinion written by Justice White, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the district court’s verdict because it concluded that the written test
was facially neutral.61 The Court decided that the disproportionate impact of
the test on black applicants did not necessitate a finding that the test was a
purposely discriminatory device.62 In order to justify its decision, the Court
asserted that a governmental action is not unconstitutional just because it has a
disparate impact upon the members of a minority group.63 The Court reasoned
that “[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution.”64
Since Davis, it has been understood that a facially neutral governmental
action may be constitutionally valid even if it disproportionally impacts racial
minorities. However, if the evidence shows that an “invidious discriminatory
purpose” was a motivating factor behind the action, the government has the
burden of proving that the action was taken using racially neutral selection
criteria and procedures.65 Therefore, in order to prove that the law or
government action violates the Equal Protection Clause, a person must trace
the disparate impact to a discriminatory purpose.66
In light of the Davis decision, to be successful, environmental
discrimination plaintiffs must show that the placement of the environmental
hazard in their community was motivated by intentional discrimination. A
person who seeks recovery under a theory of purposeful discrimination must
demonstrate that the governmental authority implemented the facially neutral
policy being challenged “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.”67 After Davis, it was clear that in order to
bring a successful equal protection case the plaintiff had to prove that the
government decision-maker was motivated by discriminatory intent.68 A few
years later, the United States Supreme Court used a case involving a denial of a
rezoning request to build low- and moderate-income housing to elaborate upon

60. Id. at 235–36.
61. Id. at 246.
62. Id.
63. Davis, 246 U.S. at 242.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 241–42.
66. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003).
67. Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
68. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
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its Davis decision.69 In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court
concluded that if a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor behind a
challenged activity, it may be shown by the introduction of circumstantial
rather than direct evidence.70
In Village of Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court suggested the
following relevant factors to use as evidentiary sources: (1) the level of impact
the governmental decision has on different races (whether the action bears
more heavily on one race than the other);71 (2) the historical background of the
decision (whether there was a series of governmental actions taken for
invidious purposes);72 (3) the sequence of events occurring prior to the
challenged action (whether there were departures, substantive or procedural,
from the normal decision-making process);73 and (4) the legislative or
administrative history of the challenged activity (whether a review of the
contemporary statements made by the decision-makers, the minutes of the
meetings regarding the challenged decision, or the reports pertaining to the
challenged decision indicate any type of unfair purpose).74 In addition to the
above-mentioned factors, the foreseeability of the adverse consequences may
have some bearing on the existence of discriminatory intent.75
If a facially neutral law is administered in a way that reveals an
overwhelming pattern of discrimination, the pattern of discrimination itself
may be enough for the court to infer discriminatory intent. This is especially
true in cases where a pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,
emerges from the challenged governmental action.76 Courts have emphasized
that “[e]specially strong statistical proof may be sufficient to draw an inference
of discriminatory intent . . . .”77
For example, in some cases, the governmental entity has engaged in a
pattern of discrimination so blatant that the Court has found discriminatory
purpose based solely on the pattern. This proposition is illustrated by the legal
69. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
70. Id. at 266–67.
71. Id. at 266.
72. Id. at 267.
73. Id.
74. Arlington Heights, 492 U.S. at 268.
75. See Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979). In addressing
the foreseeability aspect of discriminatory intent, the Court stated that discriminatory intent
“implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Id. at 279 (citation
omitted); see also Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV.
394, 409–10 (1991).
76. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360–61 (1970); see also Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S.
404, 407–08 (1967).
77. Anderson v. Cornejo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1050 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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analysis in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.78 In that case, a city ordinance prohibited
laundries from operating in wooden buildings without the consent of the city’s
board of supervisors.79 At that time, there were approximately 320 laundries in
the city and county of San Francisco; 310 of those laundries were constructed
of wood.80 Chinese residents owned 240 of the 320 laundries.81 The Chinese
residents unsuccessfully petitioned the city’s board of supervisors for
permission to continue operating their wooden laundries.82 Nonetheless, all of
the white residents (except for one woman) who requested permission to
continue operating their wooden laundries were granted exemptions from the
ordinance.83
The Court stated: “The fact that the right to give consent is reserved in the
ordinance shows that carrying on the laundry business in wooden buildings is
not deemed of itself necessarily dangerous.”84 Based upon that observation,
the Court concluded that the purpose of the ordinance was either to close most
of the Chinese laundries or to drive the Chinese out of the city and county of
San Francisco.85 According to the Court, although the law was facially neutral,
the public authority applied it with “an evil eye and an unequal hand.”86
Therefore, the Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional based on the
city’s discriminatory application of its mandates.87
Another case decided on the basis of statistics was Gomillion v.
Lightfoot.88 Gomillion involved an evaluation of the validity of Local Act No.
140. That law, which was passed by the Alabama Legislature, redefined the
boundaries of the City of Tuskegee.89 Prior to the passage of the statute, the
city was square in shape, but as a result of the statute’s mandates the shape of
the city was changed into a strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure.90
The ultimate impact of the law was to remove all except four or five of the
black citizens from the city.91 On the contrary, not a single white resident was

78. 118 U.S. 356 (1886); see also David Crump, Evidence, Race, Intent, and Evil: The
Paradox of Purposelessness in the Constitutional Racial Discrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 285, 289–291 (1998).
79. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 358.
80. Id. at 359.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 359.
84. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 361.
85. Id. at 363.
86. Id. at 373–74.
87. Id. at 363.
88. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
89. Id. at 340.
90. Id. at 341.
91. Id.
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removed from the city.92 Therefore, the result of the Act was to deprive blacks
of the benefits of living in the city, including the right to vote in city
elections.93
After the passage of the statute, a group of black city residents filed an
action claiming that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution.94 The district court granted the city’s motion for dismissal
because it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter and the
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.95 The
United States Supreme Court held that the law was probably unconstitutional,
so the petitioners were entitled to prove their allegations at trial.96 In reaching
its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that the act did not appear to be an
ordinary geographic redistricting measure. Instead, the Supreme Court noted
that it would be easy to conclude that the law was “tantamount . . . to a
mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with
segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so
as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.”97
Cases like the ones discussed above are rare and have been nonexistent in
the environmental discrimination context. As a result, the establishment of
intent as the standard for proving discrimination has placed an onerous burden
on plaintiffs. In order to be successful, these plaintiffs have to introduce
evidence showing that the governmental action was clearly motivated by
discriminatory considerations.
A central reason why plaintiffs in
environmental discrimination cases have been unable to meet their burden of
proof is the lack of access to quality information. As the results of the
environmental discrimination cases discussed in the next section indicate,
information is a vital component of putting forth a successful case.
III. CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE INTENT STANDARD IN ENVIRONMENTAL
DISCRIMINATION CASES
The following three cases illustrate how the Equal Protection doctrine has
been interpreted in cases involving the placement of environmentally
hazardous facilities in predominately minority communities. In each case, the
court rejected the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, citing an absence of clear
evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of the decision-maker. Even
though the evidence of disparate impact was clear and acknowledged by some

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 347–48.
Id. at 341.
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of the courts, the courts’ adherence to the intent requirement prevented the
plaintiffs from prevailing.98 In each case, the plaintiffs’ inability to prove
purposeful and conscious intent to discriminate on the part of the decisionmaker prevented them from winning their Equal Protection challenge.
A.

Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.99

In Bean, the plaintiffs sued to contest the Texas Department of Health’s
decision to grant a permit to Southwestern Waste Management to place a solid
waste facility in the East Houston-Dyersdale Road area in Harris County.100
The plaintiffs claimed that the decision was motivated by racial discrimination
because the city had a history of placing solid waste sites in black
neighborhoods.101
The plaintiffs relied upon statistical data to show a pattern of racial
discrimination in the state agency’s placement of solid waste sites in minority
communities.102 The first set of data supplied by the plaintiffs dealt with the
two solid wastes sites that the City of Houston planned to use.103 The plaintiffs
contended that the selection of those two sites was discriminatory because the
area contained 100% of the type-one landfills used by the City of Houston, and
only 6.9% of the entire population of the city.104 The Court found that
argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the Court reasoned that, because
only two sites were involved, the data was statistically insignificant.105
Second, the Court determined that, of the two proposed sites, one was in a
primarily white census tract and the other was in a primarily minority census
tract.106 Therefore, race was probably not a consideration when the city chose
the two sites.107
The second set of data the plaintiffs submitted focused on the total number
of solid waste sites located in the proposed target area.108 The plaintiffs noted
that the target area contained 15% of the city’s solid waste sites, but only 6.9%
of its population.109 The plaintiffs argued that most of the solid waste sites
98. See Brian Faerstein, Comment, Resurrecting Equal Protection Challenges to
Environmental Inequity: A Deliberately Indifferent Optimistic Approach, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
561, 566–569 (2004) (discussing cases where the plaintiffs attempted to use the Equal Protection
Clause to challenge industrial siting decisions).
99. 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
100. Id. at 674–75.
101. Id. at 675.
102. Id. at 678.
103. Id.
104. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 678.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 678.
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were placed in that area because it had a 70% minority population.110 The
court decided that the placement of so many solid waste sites in the target area
had nothing to do with race because it was reasonable to place the sites in an
area that was sparsely populated.111 In addition, the court concluded that race
was not a factor in the placement of the sites because half of the sites in the
target area were in census tracts with more than a 70% white population.112
The third set of data put forth by the plaintiffs considered the city as a
whole. The data showed that only 32.4% of the sites were located in the
western half of the city where 73.4% of the whites lived.113 In addition,
according to the data, 67.6% of the sites were located in the eastern half of the
city where 61.6% of the minority population resided.114 The court disagreed
with the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the data. After analyzing the data relying
on census tracts instead of halves or quadrants of the city, the court stated that
“[t]he difference between the racial composition of census tracts in general and
the racial composition of census tracts with solid waste sites is . . . only
The court found that small difference to be statistically
0.3%.”115
insignificant.116
After evaluating all of the statistical evidence, the court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument and held that, although the siting decision appeared to be
“unfortunate and insensitive” the plaintiffs had not proven that the state
officials had a discriminatory intent.117 The court pointed out several
weaknesses in the plaintiffs’ evidence. Regarding the statistical data, the court
indicated that neighborhood data, as opposed to census tract data, would have
been more forceful if the plaintiffs had shown that sites located in
predominately white census tracts were in minority neighborhoods.118
Moreover, the court found that the non-statistical data was inadequate to show
discriminatory intent.119 The court stated that, in its opinion, there were too
many unanswered questions, including how sites were selected and what
factors were used in the placement of the sites.120

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 678.
Id. at 679.
Id.
Id. at 680.
Id.
Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679–80.
Id. at 680.
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East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Commission121

The minority plaintiffs in East Bibb sought to reverse a decision by the
local planning board to locate a landfill in a predominately black
community.122 In the case, Mullis Tree Service, Inc. and Robert Mullis applied
to the Commission for a conditional use permit to operate a non-putrescible
waste landfill in a census tract containing 5,527 people.123 Of these residents,
3,367 were black and 2,149 were white.124 The Commission initially voted to
deny the application.125 However, after rehearing the matter, the Commission
approved the final site plan for the landfill and issued a conditional use permit
to Mullis.126
Analyzing the permit decision, the court applied the Arlington Heights
five-part test to determine whether the plaintiffs’ evidence supported a finding
of discriminatory intent.127 After reviewing all of the evidence, the court
concluded that the Commission’s decision to approve the conditional use
permit was not motivated by the intent to discriminate against blacks.128 The
court noted that, since the census tract contained a majority black population,
the decision to approve the placement of the landfill in that area had a greater
impact on blacks than it did on whites.129 Therefore, the court conceded that
there was glaring evidence of disparate impact.130 Nevertheless, according to
the court, there were “no specific antecedent events which support a
determination that race was a motivating factor in the Commission’s
decision.”131 In making that determination, the court emphasized that the only
other Commission-approved landfill was located in a predominately white
census tract.132
The court’s opinion did offer environmental discrimination plaintiffs some
guidance. The trial judge noted that the local Commission could not “actively
solicit this or any other landfill application,”133 and the opinion hinted that
sudden changes in zoning or relaxations in procedure would be considered

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
Id. at 881.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 882.
East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 883.
Id. at 884.
Id.
Id.
Id.
East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 886.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 885.
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highly suspect.134 The court determined that evidence of past discriminatory
decisions by agencies other than the county planning commission was
irrelevant to the discrimination issue it was considering.135 Therefore, courts
may refuse to consider the general state or city history of racism and
segregation. However, the court did not rule out the possibility of considering
past decisions by the Commission that had resulted in a disparate impact on the
minority community.136
C. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay137
In R.I.S.E., a bi-racial citizen group challenged the decision of the local
county board to site a landfill in a predominately black community in
Virginia.138 Since the landfills in King and Queen County did not meet the
state’s new environmental standards, the Board of Supervisors negotiated with
the Chesapeake Corporation for a joint venture landfill.139 During the summer
of 1988, after Chesapeake abandoned the negotiations, the board decided to
purchase property from Chesapeake to use as a landfill site.140 Chesapeake
offered the board the choice of buying either the Piedmont Tract or the
Norman-Saunders Tract.141 The board selected the Piedmont Tract because
tests showed that it was suitable for use as a landfill.142 After several public
hearings, members of the Board unanimously voted to buy the Piedmont Tract
for use as a landfill.143
The members of the community where the proposed landfill was to be
located opposed the project.144 To hear the concerns of the residents, several
board members attended a meeting organized by Reverend Taylor, pastor of
Second Mt. Olive Baptist Church.145 The persons objecting to the project were
worried that if the landfill was placed in their neighborhood (1) their quality of
life would be diminished; (2) their property values would be lowered; (3) their
worship and social functions at Second Mt. Olive Baptist Church would be
disrupted; (4) the grave sites on the church grounds would be damaged; (5)

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 886.
Id. at 885.
East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 885.
768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991).
Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1146.
R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1146).
Id. at 1147.
Id.
Id.
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local access roads would have to be improved; and (6) the historic church146
and community would be harmed.147
In light of the fact that the three other landfills in the area were all in
neighborhoods that were at least ninety-five percent black and that the county
had previously refused to site a landfill in a predominately white
neighborhood, the court acknowledged that the landfill had a disproportionate
impact upon the black community.148 Nonetheless, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs had not satisfied the remainder of the discriminatory purpose
equation and rejected the Equal Protection claim.149
The court was influenced by the board’s need to decide quickly on a
location for the landfill.150 The board’s prior attempt to buy landfill space had
been unsuccessful.151
Because the Piedmont Tract had been found
environmentally suitable for the purpose of the landfill development, instead of
looking at other possible locations, the board took immediate steps to acquire
the property.152 Moreover, the court seemed to give some weight to the fact
that the board making the siting decision contained three white members and
two black members.153 Further, the court appeared to suspect R.I.S.E.’s
motives in bringing a discrimination action to challenge the siting decision.
The court stated that “[r]ace discrimination did not become a significant public
issue until it appeared that the initial thrust was failing.”154 The court’s
skepticism was probably based upon the fact that R.I.S.E. recommended a
replacement site that was located in a predominately black area.155
D. Components of a Successful Environmental Discrimination Case
The intent requirement has been a major stumbling block for
environmental discrimination plaintiffs seeking relief under the Equal
Protection Clause.156 Nonetheless, the courts have acknowledged that if the
plaintiffs present the correct type of circumstantial evidence, they can prevail
using the Equal Protection Clause. The courts have given no indication that
they will substitute the intent requirement for a lesser standard.157 In order to

146. In 1869, freed slaves built the Second Mt. Olive Baptist Church. Id.
147. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1147.
148. Id. at 1148–49.
149. Id. at 1149.
150. Id. at 1150.
151. Id.
152. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1150.
153. See id. at 1146.
154. Id. at 1148.
155. Id.
156. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 829–33 (1993).
157. Cox v. City of Jackson, 343 F. Supp. 2d 546, 570 (S.D. Miss. 2004).
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meet the burden of proof, under the current system, plaintiffs must have access
to information. Therefore, persons fighting environmental discrimination
should take steps to gather the information necessary to prove discriminatory
intent.
In light of the case precedent, this section is an attempt to demonstrate the
important role that information plays in preparing a successful equal protection
action in the environmental discrimination context. The starting point in
preparing an Equal Protection case is still the Arlington Heights factors.158
Therefore, the focus of the discussion is upon the criteria established by that
case. A multi-factor approach similar to the one adopted here has been taken
by others.159 The factors dealing with events leading up to the decision and the
legislative and administrative history of the decisions are combined.
1.

Disparate Impact

The first thing an environmental discrimination plaintiff needs to establish
is the existence of racially disparate impact.160 In order to be successful, it is
important for the plaintiff to have good statistical data. According to Bradford
Mank, the selection of the population sample for comparison impacts the
disparate impact analysis. Mank further asserts that, in order to prove
disparate impact, the plaintiff must compare the demographics of those in the
adversely affected area with others in the area who are not impacted by the
decision.161 The effort and expense involved in gathering data often leads
plaintiffs to conduct their analyses using “pre-ordained units of [population]
comparison, such as census tracts or zip codes.”162 Census data is often used
because it is readily available in paper and computerized forms.163 The EPA
suggests the use of census data to classify the population in the affected area
with regards to race, ethnicity, economic, and educational demographics.164
However, the agency cautions that census data may not be accurate in some

158. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).
159. See e.g., Alice Kaswan, Environmental Law: Grist For The Equal Protection Mill, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 387, 411-426 (1999).).
160. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning
Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 884 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
161. Bradford C. Mank, Proving an Environmental Justice Case: Determining an
Appropriate Comparison Population, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 365, 383 (2001).
162. Id. at 410; see also EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at § 2.1.2 (stating that data obtained
from the census is one of the most common types of information used to determine the minority
status of a community).
163. The EPA opines that the availability of census demographic information in digitized
format can be helpful when analyzing environmental justice issues. EPA GUIDANCE, supra note
9, at § 5.1.
164. Id.
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cases.165 One possible cause of this deficiency is the fact that census data is
the result of self-reporting.166
In most instances, such as in the Bean case, this type of analysis presents
problems.167 In that case, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ case might
have been stronger if they had submitted neighborhood data as opposed to
census tract data.168 The census tract data presented did not provide a true
picture of the community affected by the proposed landfill. In justifying its
decision not to find a discriminatory purpose, the court noted that the county’s
other landfill was located in a predominately white census tract.169
In order to obtain better information to submit to the court about the
composition of the community, the plaintiffs should use other methods. For
instance, they may be able to get information from local resources by asking
questions, conducting interviews, and doing research.170 Additionally, the
plaintiffs can use a geographic information system (GIS)171 or a similar
mapping system to identify the location and percentage of the minority persons
in the community.172 The EPA has acknowledged that maps, aerial
photographs, and GIS can be used to discover geographic areas where possible
environmental justice concerns subsist.173
It appears that the plaintiffs will have a better claim if they are able to
show, for example, that the area immediately surrounding the proposed facility
is composed almost exclusively of minority residents and that the population
becomes whiter as the distance from the facility increases. Hence, in order to
obtain the most useful data, environmental discrimination plaintiffs should use
an analytic method that analyzes demographics in terms of proximity to the
proposed hazard.174
The effects of an environmental hazard frequently occur in inverse
proportion to the distance from the location or site of the hazard.175 For

165. See id. at § 2.1.2. “[I]t may be necessary for the EPA NEPA analyst to validate [census]
information with the use of additional sources.” Id. “The additional methods . . . include
contacting local resources, government agencies, commercial database firms, and the use of
locational/distributional tools.” Id.
166. Id. at § 5.1.
167. Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 678.
170. See generally EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at §§ 2.1.2, 5.1.
171. GIS systems are geographic references or computerized atlases. See id. at § 5.1.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Richard D. Gragg, III et al., The Location and Community Demographics of
Targeted Environmental Hazardous Sites in Florida, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 12–14
(1996) (describing a study conducted in fifteen Florida counties).
175. See Julia B. Latham Worsham, Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602:
Can a Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 631, 649 (2000)
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example, the closer the minority population is to the hazard, the greater the
likelihood that those persons will be adversely impacted. Thus, proximity to
the environmental hazard usually correlates with the probability that the
minority population will be disproportionately affected by the location of the
hazard.176 As a consequence, if environmental discrimination advocates can
show that minority persons in the community live nearest to the environmental
hazard, they may have a better chance of proving disparate impact.
Commentators have suggested the use of “maps, aerial photographs, and
information databases” in order to identify the communities that are within
close proximity of the proposed project.177
2.

Historical Background

In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court suggested that courts look to the
role of historical discrimination to determine discriminatory intent.178 The
court in East Bibb, however, stated that it would only consider relevant
discrimination perpetrated by the particular government agency that made the
decision being challenged by the plaintiffs.179 In the context of hazardous
waste sitings, the agencies are usually newly created, so they may have no
history of discrimination. Therefore, environmental discrimination plaintiffs
will be at a substantial disadvantage when trying to gather the information
necessary to prove discriminatory intent.
Furthermore, it appears that the court’s focus may be even narrower than
the actions of the agency involved in the case. For instance, in R.I.S.E., while
analyzing the past siting decisions of the board, the court pointed out which
present board members had been involved in making those decisions.180
Consequently, it is possible that the plaintiffs could prove discriminatory intent
in past siting decisions by the agency at issue, and still fail, if the current
members were not a part of the agency at the time those siting decisions were
made.
(citing EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS
CHALLENGING PERMITS (1998), and stating that the identity of the population affected is
“generally determined by proximity to the facility”).
176. Gragg et al., supra note 174, at 16–17.
177. Cheryl A. Calloway & Karen L. Ferguson, The “Human Environment” Requirement of
the National Environmental Policy Act: Implications for Environmental Justice, 1997 DETROIT C.
L. MICH. ST. L. REV. 1147, 1165 (1997); see also EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at § 5.1. Local
maps and aerial photographs may give a “snap shot,” or big picture of where low-income and
minority persons are located in the area and their proximity to the proposed project. Id. They
may also be used to identify important natural resources that may be affected by the proposed
project. Id.
178. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1976).
179. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning
Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 885 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
180. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D. Va. 1991).
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One potential solution to the problem is for the plaintiffs to have
background checks conducted on the individual agency members to determine
their attitudes toward racial minorities. This information may also be gained
by searching old newspapers.181 Another potential source of this type of
information is minutes from agency meetings or pubic hearings. If the
plaintiffs are able to discover insensitive remarks the members have made in
their public and/or private capacity, they may be able to convince the court that
the remarks are relevant to show that racial discrimination affected the
agency’s decision-making process. In addition, the plaintiffs may strengthen
their case if they can show that an agency member’s past behavior indicates
that he or she has a tendency to disregard the concerns of the minority
community (e.g., associating with a business venture that exploits minorities).
The racial composition of the decision-making body may also come into
play under this factor. This seemed to carry some weight in R.I.S.E. In that
case, when finding no discriminatory purpose, the court emphasized that the
board making the decision contained two black members.182 The court’s
reliance on that fact to support its finding of no discriminatory purpose is
flawed for two reasons. First, the court did not consider the fact that the black
members on the board were out-numbered three to two.183 Thus, even if both
black members had voted against the siting decision, the permit probably
would have still been approved. Second, the court’s reasoning presupposes
that blacks are not capable of intentionally discriminating against other blacks.
It is entirely possible for an all minority decision-making body to intentionally
discriminate against a predominantly minority community.184 In addition, the
court noted that the two black members were elected to the board in a special
election, after the federal government ordered a redistricting.185 The fact that
the election was ordered should have indicated to the court that some type of
racial tension might have existed in the county.

181. See East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 885. The court was willing to read newspaper articles to
get historical background on decision-makers. Id.
182. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1146 (noting the racial composition of the board).
183. See id.
184. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice
Marshall stated:
Social scientists agree that members of minority groups frequently respond to
discrimination and prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves from the group,
even to the point of adopting the majority’s negative attitudes towards the minority. Such
behavior occurs with particular frequency among members of minority groups who have
achieved some measure of economic or political success and thereby have gained some
acceptability among the dominant group.
Id.
185. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1146.
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Departures from Procedure

The East Bibb plaintiffs argued that the Commission had deviated from its
normal procedures in several ways: the Commission urged participation from
the city and county, it granted a rehearing after the petition for a landfill was
denied, and it made certain findings of fact.186 The court acknowledged that
the Commission had departed somewhat from the norm, but did not identify
any procedural flaws.187 However, the court did analyze the reasons behind
the procedural changes and indicated that sudden changes in procedure would
be given a hard look.188
Therefore, environmental discrimination plaintiffs should gather
information to familiarize themselves with the agency’s decision-making
procedures by attending meetings dealing with the placement of environmental
hazards, reading the agency’s regulations or bylaws, and looking through
minutes of agency meetings. To support their assertions, the plaintiffs need to
present evidence that the decision-making body deviated from its normal
practices when it decided to approve the placement of an environmental hazard
in their community. This will shift the burden to the agency to justify its
actions. Moreover, if the agency has no independent siting criteria, the
plaintiff should point that out to the court. The lack of objective criteria for
making placement decisions may indicate that the decision-makers were
subjective in the selection process. As a result, the courts may be more willing
to find discriminatory intent.
4.

Events Prior to the Decision

The court may be willing to infer discriminatory intent from relevant
actions that occurred before the agency decided to place the environmental
hazard in a minority neighborhood. For example, in Bean, the court stated that
it would have been helpful to know the initial reason the chosen site was
selected for consideration.189 In addition, the East Bibb court opined that it
would not be proper for the decision-making agency to actively solicit an
application to place a site in a certain neighborhood.190 Hence, the
environmental discrimination plaintiff should do discovery as soon as possible
to try to find information about the selection process.191 If plaintiffs are able to
prove that the selection of the minority neighborhood was anything but

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
case).

East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 886.
Id.
See id.
Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 885.
See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 680 (noting that extensive discovery was not conducted in this
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random, the court may be more willing to question the motives of the decisionmakers.
The plaintiff should also try to show that at the time the site was
considered the agency members knew that the disparate impact would occur
because they were aware that the affected community was already substantially
burdened by environmental hazards. It must be noted, however, that in
response to that argument, the court in Bean stated that a sample of two sites
was not a sufficient database to create a statistically significant result.192 To
avoid that problem, the plaintiffs should focus on other types of environmental
hazards in addition to the type at issue. For instance, the affected
neighborhood may already have major highways running through it, an airport
nearby, and several industrial plants located within it. Recognizing that the
agency knew that the affected neighborhood already contained these hazards
before it made its siting decision may make the court view the decision more
critically.
Another factor that the court considered relevant in East Bibb was the fact
that the county had previously refused to site the landfill at the approved site,
and it had apparently not considered siting the landfill in a predominately
white neighborhood.193 Consequently, the plaintiffs may have a strong case for
discriminatory intent if they are able to show that the siting agency did not
consider any suitable predominately white neighborhoods as a potential
location for the environmental hazard.
5.

Other Considerations

The formula for proving intent in an environmental discrimination case
comes down to the plaintiffs obtaining good information, including statistical
and scientific data, by conducting thorough discovery and utilizing other
investigative techniques. The need for presenting good statistical data has
been addressed in the previous section. Thus, the focus of this section is on the
need for good science.
Good scientific testing will enable the plaintiffs to determine if the
proposed site is environmentally suitable for the proposed use. It will also
allow the plaintiffs to discover if there are other locations in non-minority
neighborhoods that could accommodate the proposed project. Additionally,
the plaintiffs will take a big step toward proving a discriminatory purpose if
they find a site in the area that is almost identical, but for racial composition, to
the one selected. Having the scientific expertise will assist the plaintiffs in
suggesting alternative sites. If the plaintiffs in R.I.S.E. had availed themselves
of scientific technology, they might have been able to convince the board to
locate the site in another suitable location. The alternative sites recommended
192. Id.
193. 706 F. Supp. at 884–85.
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by the plaintiffs in R.I.S.E. were determined to be “environmentally unsuitable
because of the slope of the land and the existence of a stream running through
its center.”194
In the environmental discrimination area, the courts have made it clear that
the placement of an environmental hazard in a minority community would be a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the plaintiffs showed a disparate
impact and proved that the placement decision was made with a discriminatory
intent. Thus, the earlier the plaintiffs get involved in the siting process the
better chance they will have to compile the significant amount of information
necessary to use as circumstantial evidence to build a winning Equal Protection
case.
IV. THE DEBATE OVER THE VALIDITY OF THE INTENT REQUIREMENT
After showing a disparate impact, in order to convince the court to apply
strict scrutiny195 to a governmental action, the plaintiff has to prove that the
action was motivated by a desire to discriminate against the plaintiff because
of his race.196 In the environmental discrimination context, this means that the
plaintiff has to prove that the governmental actor decided to allow the
environmental hazard to be located in the plaintiff’s community because of the
race of the residents. Once the plaintiff meets his or her burden of proof, the
burden shifts to the governmental actor to justify the government’s decision.197
The first step the governmental actor must take to survive strict scrutiny is to
“articulate a legislative goal that is properly considered a compelling
government interest.”198 Then, the government must show that the decision it
made or action it took was narrowly drawn to achieve that compelling
governmental interest.199
Proponents have continued to embrace the justifications that the
Washington v. Davis Court used when advancing the discriminatory intent

194. R.I.S.E., Inc., v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D. Va. 1991).
195. “To survive strict scrutiny, an ordinance must be justified by compelling governmental
interests and employ the least restrictive means to effectuate those interests.” Deida v. City of
Milwaukee, 176 F. Supp. 2d 859, 864 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
196. Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2003).
197. See Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep’t. of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir.
2003); Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1574, 1576 (N.D. Fla. 1996).
198. Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 969 (8th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Barre, 313 F.
Supp. 2d 1086, 1090 (D. Colo. 2004), rev’d, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (2004). “The question is not
whether the government has a compelling interest in generally enacting the law. The inquiry
under equal protection is whether there is a compelling interest for the classification created by
the law.” Barre, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
199. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. at 1576; see also Florida A.G.C. Council, Inc. v. Florida, 303 F.
Supp. 2d 1307, 1314 (N.D. Fla. 2004).
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requirement.200 According to the Justices in the Davis case, one explanation
for requiring equal protection plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent is the
need for judicial economy.201 The Court opined that, if the plaintiffs only had
to prove disproportionate impact, the level of governmental action that would
be subject to strict judicial scrutiny would increase.202 As a consequence,
legitimate legislative decision-making would be adversely impacted and the
validity of governmental actions, including tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes would be in doubt.203
In his article, Professor Charles R. Lawrence III puts forth several other
possible justifications for the Davis intent requirement.204 One justification
Professor Lawrence states in his article can be characterized as judicial
fairness. He states that the Court determined that it would be unfair for the
judiciary to impose penalties on innocent persons in order to remedy harms
that they did not intentionally cause.205 In addition, Professor Lawrence
contends that the Davis Justices’ adoption of the discriminatory intent
requirement may be defended on the basis of judicial consistency.206 Making
the standard disproportionate impact, as opposed to discriminatory intent,
would be inconsistent with traditional equal protection values because, in order
to resolve the issue, the judicial decision-maker would have to focus upon the
race of the plaintiffs.207 Finally, Lawrence seems to indicate that the Davis
Justices’ decision to require discriminatory intent may be explained on the
basis of judicial responsibility.208 It may be argued that it would be improper
for the courts to adversely impact legitimate social interests in an attempt to
remedy the racially disproportionate impact of facially neutral government
actions.209
The persons who disagree with the discriminatory intent requirement have
consistently stated several main reasons for their opposition. One reason put
forth by those persons is that the discriminatory intent requirement places an
arduous and unfair burden of proof on the plaintiff.210 The time and expense

200. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 320 (1987).
201. See id. at 383.
202. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
203. Id. at 248 (citing Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275, 300 (1972)).
204. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 320.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 320–21.
209. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 320–21.
210. See Musa Keenheel, The Need for New Legislation and Liberalization of Current Laws
to Combat Environmental Racism, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 105, 119 (2001) (stating that
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necessary to determine the motive of a governmental actor can be prohibitive,
especially since prospective plaintiffs are frequently low-income people and
minorities who often do not have the money to hire an attorney or expert
witnesses.211 As a consequence, very few plaintiffs are able to get the courts to
recognize and resolve incidents of racial discrimination.212
There are also practical things that make it difficult for plaintiffs to obtain
the information necessary to prove that the governmental actor has acted with a
discriminatory purpose. For example, the task of discovering the intent of the
governmental actor will be easier if there is a detailed record of the steps the
governmental actor took to reach the challenged decision. The decision to
permit the placement of environmental hazards is usually made at the local
level, and local governmental agencies often do not maintain detailed
records.213 Therefore, there is not usually a “smoking gun” for the
environmental discrimination plaintiff to find.214
Opponents also allege that the discriminatory intent constraint ignores
three important realities. First, since a person can unconsciously be motivated
by racism, the governmental actor may not be aware that his decision is based
upon racist beliefs.215 Specifically, Professor Lawrence argues that
[t]raditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial
matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as
neither intentional—in the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously
sought—nor unintentional—in the sense that the outcomes are random,
fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker’s beliefs, desires, and
wishes.216

“proving discriminatory intent has been the albatross around the necks of minority plaintiffs
seeking relief from instances of environmental racism”).
211. Robert Nelson, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminatory Purpose: Rethinking Equal
Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 334, 344 (1986); see also Godsil, supra note 75, at 410;
Leslie Ann Coleman, It’s the Thought That Counts: The Intent Requirement in Environmental
Racism Claims, 25 ST. MARY’S L. J. 447, 473–74 (1993).
212. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 324; see also Donna Gareis-Smith, Environmental Racism:
The Failure of Equal Protection to Provide a Judicial Remedy and the Potential of Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 57, 67 (1994).
213. Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It’s Not Easy Bein’ Green: The Psychology of Racism,
Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46
VAND. L. REV. 937, 964–65 (1993).
214. Id. at 965.
215. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1806 (2000); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186 (1995).
216. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 322; see also Miriam Kim, Note and Comment,
Discrimination in the Wen Ho Lee Case: Reinterpreting the Intent Requirement in Constitutional
and Statutory Race Discrimination Cases, 9 ASIAN L.J. 117, 139 (2002).
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Secondly, since most governmental decisions are made by a group and not
by individuals, the governmental action results from the interaction of multiple
motives.217 Thus, it is almost impossible to attribute discriminatory intent to a
group of people.218 As a result, each individual decision-maker will be able to
argue that his action was based upon racially neutral considerations.219
Thirdly, in this day of political correctness, governmental decision-makers will
be sure to hide any improper motives that may have contributed to their
actions.220 Moreover, opponents of the discriminatory intent requirement
argue that the negative impact of unequal treatment is felt by the affected
community regardless of whether that negative impact was caused by
intentional or unintentional discrimination.221

217. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971). Justice Black stated:
First, it is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of
different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment. . . . It is difficult or
impossible for any court to determine the “sole” or “dominant” motivation behind the
choices of a group of legislators. Furthermore, there is an element of futility in a judicial
attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law is
struck down for this reason, rather than because of its facial content or effect, it would
presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for
different reasons.
Id.
218. See BULLARD, supra note 13, at 15 (“Institutional racism continues to affect policy
decisions related to the enforcement of environmental regulations.”); see also Rebecca Hanner
White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor
Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 530 (2001); Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh
Bhagwat, The McClesky Puzzle: Remedying Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black Victims
in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 145, 154–55 (1998); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 956–58 (1989) (addressing the futility
of inquiring if a group consciously decided to engage in intentional discrimination).
219. See East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning
Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 883 n.4 (M.D. Ga. 1989). According to the court, on the record,
three commissioners stated a neutral reason for voting in favor of or against the approval of the
landfill project. Id. Commissioner Pippinger contended that he voted to approve the application
after he reviewed “all of the details[,] the use of the land and the facts and conclusions . . . .” Id.
In voting against the project, Commissioner Ingram stated that the proposed project did not
satisfy the need for a comprehensive waste management plan. Commission Ingram also objected
to reconsidering the application after it had already been denied. Id. Commissioner Cullinan
voted to grant the landfill permit and stated: “We can’t rule on sites until they are brought to use.
This site was brought to us. . . . If others are brought to us in North Macon, South Macon, West
Macon, we have to be as deliberative and as thoughtful and make an independent assessment
there to see whether in fact the land use is adequate.” Id.
220. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 319.
221. Id.
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A Few of the Proposed Alternatives to the Intent Requirement

Since most discrimination is not blatant and decision-makers usually do
not leave a paper trail showing discriminatory motive, it will continue to be
difficult for environmental discrimination plaintiffs to meet the intent
threshold.
In addition, at the time the Court established conscious
discriminatory intent as the standard equal protection plaintiffs had to meet, in
many parts of the country overt racism was commonplace.222 However, over
the last few decades, society has indicated that overt racism will not be
tolerated.223 Thus, in this day of political correctness,224 the incidences of
overt racism by persons in the public eye are immediately condemned.225
Today, most of the racism in the country is covert.226 Hence, the plaintiffs in
equal protection cases have an almost insurmountable task when it comes to
proving blatant intent to discriminate on the part of the governmental actor.227
Even if environmental discrimination plaintiffs are able to put together a
forceful case, the chances of winning are slim because circumstantial evidence
is capable of being interpreted in so many different ways. As a result, the
environmental discrimination plaintiff is forced to suffer tremendous harm on a
daily basis.228
Regardless of the decision-maker’s intent, minorities feel the impact of
discriminatory environmental practices. It is of no help or solace to the
communities whose children are poisoned by lead,229 or to families
222. See Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a
Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 928
(1999); see also Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-coding” Colorblind Slurs During the
Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 617–18 (2000).
223. See Roger I. Abrams, Off His Rocker: Sports Discipline and Labor Arbitration, 11
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 167, 171 (2001). In evaluating the harshness of John Rocker’s
punishment for making racist statements in a magazine interview, the author notes “Rocker’s was
the harshest player discipline for off-work behavior unconnected to misconduct such as substance
abuse and gambling. . . . Ty Cobb was a notorious racist during a time when the country accepted
such sentiments as natural and appropriate.” Id.
224. See Charles R. Calleros, Reconciliation of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties After R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul: Free Speech, Antiharrassment Policies, Multicultural Education, and Political
Correctness at Arizona State University, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1205, 1263–64 (1992).
225. See Ross D. Petty et al., Regulating Target Marketing and Other Race-Based Advertising
Practices, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 337–338 (2003) (discussing the treatment of Trent Lott
after his remarks at Strom Thurman’s birthday party).
226. Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept
of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219, 1275 (1998).
227. Id.
228. See Nelson, supra note 211, at 344.
229. See Jane Schukoske, The Evolving Paradigm of Laws on Lead-Based Paint: From Code
Violation to Environmental Hazard, 45 S.C. L. REV. 511, 516 (1994). “A disproportionately high
number of ethnic minority children live in poverty, in dilapidated housing, and are poisoned by
lead paint.” Id. (citing KAREN L. FLORINI ET AL., ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND, LEGACY OF LEAD:
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experiencing various illnesses as a result of exposure to toxic emissions, that
the polluter did not overtly single out minorities to be almost the exclusive
recipients of the pollution.230 Moreover, the discriminatory intent requirement
ignores the fact that racist decisions may be motivated by overt racism or the
unconscious racist attitudes of the decision-maker. Numerous commentators
have argued that proof of discriminatory intent dooms many equal protection
cases because unconscious racism, on an individual and an institutional level,
is widespread in our society.231
The criticism of the intent requirement has led to numerous suggestions for
replacement standards.
Some commentators have argued that the
discriminatory intent requirement should be totally abandoned when legislative
actions have a substantial disparate impact on a suspect class.232 Others, who
disagree with the intent requirement, appear to oppose the standard of proof the
plaintiffs have to meet to be successful. Thus, they have proposed alternatives
that focus upon the type of information the plaintiffs should have to submit to
prove discriminatory intent.233 This section offers a brief summary of a few of
the suggested proposals.

AMERICA’S CONTINUING EPIDEMIC OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING, Appendix 1, Table A-1).
“In 1988, in metropolitan areas of more than one million, approximately 68% of black children
and 36% of white children in households earning under $6,000 have blood lead levels in excess
of fifteen milligrams per deciliter, in households with incomes between $6,000 and $14,999, the
estimates are 54% of black children and 23% of white children.” Schukoske, supra, at 516–17
n.30.
230. According to a study released by the Citizens’ Environmental Coalition, an advocacy
group located in New York, minority neighborhoods are more likely than white neighborhoods to
be the location of environmental hazards, including incinerators and bus depots. Paul H.B. Shin,
A Cloud Over Minority Nabes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 12, 2004, at 28.
231. E.g., Valerie P. Mahoney, Environmental Justice: From Partial Victories To Complete
Solutions, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 366 (1999); see also Marguerite A. Driessen, Toward a
More Realistic Standard for Proving Discriminatory Intent, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
19, 41 (2002) (analyzing Charles Lawrence’s notion that unconscious racism is “just as
pernicious an evil as deliberate discrimination, and . . . has no place in governmental action”);
Colopy, supra note 33, at 151–52 (illustrating that a required showing of intent for redress in
cases of institutional racism “legitimizes the presumption that conscious racism is blameworthy
but unconscious racism is not”); Boyle, supra note 213, at 938 (discussing how racist attitudes
can unconsciously influence decisional actions and informational processing, contributing to the
incomplete understanding of racial discrimination).
232. See Boyle, supra note 213, at 980–81 (proposing the replacement of the intent
requirement with an intermediate test in which plaintiffs would have to show that the actions of
the government caused significant disparate impact on a suspect class).
233. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 355–58 (proposing that plaintiff submit data on
“cultural meaning” of a racially discriminatory act).
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Commentator Edward P. Boyle proposes that courts abandon the intent
standard and apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to all legislative decisions
that have a substantial disparate impact on suspect classes.234 In evaluating its
decision, courts would ask whether the structure of the decision-making
process was likely to generate a disparate racial outcome.235 Under an
intermediate-level scrutiny approach, the plaintiffs would first have to show
that the governmental act had a significant disparate impact upon the suspect
class of which they were members.236 The class members would meet that
burden by showing that an extraordinarily large number or percentage of class
members were disadvantaged by the decision-makers’ actions.237 If the class
members did not meet their burden on the disparate impact issue, the decisionmakers would prevail.238 In the event that the class members were able to
sustain their burden of proof, the decision-makers could still defeat the class
members’ claim by proving that a significant number or percentage of the
persons similarly impacted were not members of a suspect class. If the court
found the evidence of impact to be inconclusive, it would look at similar past
actions by the decision-makers to determine if any of those prior decisions had
a disparate racial impact.239
If the class members successfully demonstrated that only the members of
their class suffered the disparate impact, the decision-makers would bear the
burden of proving that the class members’ interests were represented
adequately in the decision-making process.240 The decision-makers could
satisfy their burden by showing that the class representatives were part of the
decision-making process and that those representatives were fully informed of
the threat the decision posed to the class members.241 Subsequently, the
burden would shift to the class members to prove that their interests were
inadequately represented or that the decision-making process was defective.242
In evaluating the adequacy of representation, the court would consider the
following factors: (1) the number of suspect class representatives who were
actually decision-makers or otherwise substantially involved in the decisionmaking process; (2) the process by which the representatives were chosen; (3)
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See Boyle, supra note 213, at 980–81.
Id. at 980.
Id.
Id. at 980–81.
Id. at 981.
Boyle, supra note 213, at 981.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the level of communication between the impacted parties and their
representatives; (4) the quality of information made available to those
impacted and their representatives; (5) the amount of consideration that the
decision-makers gave to less intrusive options; and (6) the incentives of the
representatives, if any, that might have run counter to the interests of the
impacted group.243
The court’s finding on the representation would determine the level of
scrutiny the court would apply to the challenged decision.244 If the court
concluded that the interests of the impacted group were adequately represented
and not hampered by deficiencies in the decision-making process, the decisionmakers would only have to show that they had a rational basis for making their
decision.245 Conversely, if the court found that suspect class representatives
did not adequately participate in the decision-making process, it would
carefully examine the decision to determine if the decision-makers had given
adequate consideration to the interests of those impacted.246 The court would
weigh the severity of the disparate impact on the class members against the
extent of the inadequate representation and nature of the governmental interest
at stake.247 Since, in most cases, the class members would lack access to
evidence regarding the decision-making process, the court would presume that
the decision-makers’ decision was discriminatory because of the inadequate
representation.248 The decision-makers could rebut this presumption by
presenting evidence that they considered the impacted group’s interests despite
the inadequacy of representation or that the decision was supported by a
compelling government interest.249 In order for the class members to support
their case, they would submit evidence of discrimination in the decisionmaking process along with a history of the decision-makers’ actual
discrimination.250 Under this test, the court’s focus would be on whether the
decision-making process sufficiently protected the concerns of the impacted
class members.251
The value of this proposed test is that it would require courts to do a
thorough evaluation of the decision-making process instead of just focusing on
the individual placement decision.252 This probing would benefit the plaintiff
and the public. The plaintiff would benefit because a critical analysis of the

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 981–82.
Boyle, supra note 213, at 982.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Boyle, supra note 213, at 982.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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decision-making process is more likely to reveal evidence of racial bias on the
part of the decision-maker. In addition, if persons making environmental siting
decisions knew that the process, as well as the decision, was subject to judicial
scrutiny, they would probably take precautions to ensure the fairness of the
process.
In the environmental context, this would mean that the decision-makers
would take steps to ensure that members of the impacted community are
represented in the decision-making process.253 Under the current system,
decision-makers often choose to approve the placement of environmental
hazards in the communities where they are likely to encounter the least amount
of resistance. If the interests of persons in minority communities are fully
represented in the process, decision-makers may be hesitant to repeatedly place
environmental hazards in their communities.
Application of Boyle’s proposed test would benefit the public because it
would force the decision-makers to make more informed placement choices
and to fully consider the consequences of their actions. Further, if the
decision-making process does not have the appearance of impropriety, there
may be a decline in the number of lawsuits filed against the governmental
entity. Thus, the resources spent defending lawsuits may be available to fund
projects that benefit the community.
The main weakness of this proposed test is that it recommends that the
court apply a standard that is less than strict scrutiny to cases involving
allegations of racial discrimination.254 In those types of cases, the government
should always have to satisfy the strict scrutiny requirement.255 Additionally,
Boyle’s theory may be just as burdensome on the environmental discrimination
plaintiff as the current intent requirement. In order to meet his or her
evidentiary burden under Boyle’s test, the plaintiff would have to submit a
large amount of detailed information to the court. If the plaintiff has access to
that kind of information, he or she would probably be able to satisfy the
discriminatory intent requirement as it is currently applied.
The problem minorities face is the cumulative impact of the placement of
several environmental hazards in their communities. Therefore, any legal tool
that permits courts to evaluate the decision-making process instead of the
isolated placement decision will be beneficial to persons fighting
environmental discrimination. On balance, implementation of Boyle’s test

253. See id. at 984–87 (analyzing two examples of possible inadequate representation of a
suspect class under the intermediate scrutiny theory).
254. See Boyle, supra note 213, at 981–82 (proposing that the court apply a rational basis or
intermediate scrutiny standard when evaluating a case depending on the facts).
255. See Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2419 (2005) (discussing the importance of
applying strict scrutiny in cases involving government-imposed racial classifications).
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would provide more benefits than burdens to the persons combating
environmental discrimination.
b.

Environmental Tort Theory

Professor Kathy Seward Northern proposes creating a new tort to deal with
environmental discrimination issues.256 The tort would be the “intent to cause
racially disproportionate exposure to environmental burdens.”257 Under
Professor Northern’s theory, an owner or operator of an environmental hazard
would be subject to liability if his intentional conduct imposed a “racially
disproportionate environmental burden.”258 The owner or operator would be
liable for “resulting bodily harm, mental distress, or property damage.”259 The
plaintiff would have to prove that the owner or operator intended to impose the
racially disproportionate environmental burden.260
Professor Northern proposes using a different definition of intent than the
one that is currently required in equal protection cases.261 The proposed
replacement definition of intent would be based upon tort law principles.262
Thus, in the context of this new tort, intent would include a purpose or desire
to bring about a given consequence and a substantial certainty that such a
consequence would occur.263 Courts would apply a reasonable person standard
in evaluating whether the defendant had the necessary intent.264 Therefore, if a
reasonable person in the actor’s position believed that his action was
substantially certain to cause a harmful or offensive contact, the defendant
would be treated as though he had intended that result.265
One purpose of Professor Northern’s proposed tort is to encourage owners
and operators of facilities currently located in minority communities to comply
fully with environmental regulations.266 A second purpose is to discourage
owners and operators of environmental hazards from concentrating such
hazards in minority communities and from placing the hazards in
geographically or geologically unsuitable areas.267
If Professor Northern’s proposal is adopted, it will provide more options
for persons combating environmental discrimination. The environmentally

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Northern supra note 15, at 577–78.
Id. at 578.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Northern, supra note 15, at 583.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 574.
Id.
Northern, supra note 15, at 578–79.
Id.
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discriminated-against plaintiff will benefit from the application of tort law
because tort law has a more expansive definition of intent. In tort law there is
a presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of
his action.268 Therefore, intent is attributed to a person if he or she acted with
purpose or design or with substantial certainty that the result would occur.269
Expansion of the definition of intent will enable courts to consider unconscious
racism. As a consequence, decision-makers will give more consideration to
the impact their decisions may have on minority communities.270
Another positive aspect of Professor Northern’s theory is that it would
place the financial burden on the entities that are directly responsible for the
disproportionate placement of the environmental hazard. The owner or
operator of the facility causing the harm should have to compensate the
plaintiffs. Owners and operators are in the best position to make sure that a
facility is as environment-friendly as possible. Those persons are also the ones
with the most information about the impact an environmental hazard will have
on members of the community.
One of the drawbacks of relying on tort law to remedy the disproportionate
placement of environmental hazards in minority communities is that the
plaintiffs will be deprived of the protections that minority persons receive in
constitutional cases. Thus, the standard that decision-makers will have to meet
to justify their actions will be less stringent. In addition, the remedies available
under tort law may be limited. The primary remedy available under tort law is
usually damages.271 In environmental cases, the plaintiffs may not suffer
damages until several years after they have been exposed to the hazards. At
that time, the statute of limitations may prevent the plaintiffs from bringing a
cause of action.272 Moreover, the plaintiffs’ initial injuries may be minor.

268. Cheek v. Hamlin, 277 N.E.2d 620, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
269. “Substantial certainty” has been described as more than “mere knowledge and
appreciation of a risk.” Pariseau v. Wedge Prods., Inc., 522 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ohio 1988)
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS 36 (5th ed. 1984)).
270. The possibility of tort liability may serve as a deterrent to decision-makers who are
inclined to place environmental hazards in minority communities that are already heavily
polluted. See Northern, supra note 15, at 578–79.
271. JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 607 (3d ed.
2002).
272. ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND
PROBLEMS 344 (2003). “A statute of limitations relates to the time a plaintiff should reasonably
have known that he or she had a legal claim and bars a claim unless it is filed within a certain
period after that time.” Id.; see also GEORGE C. CHRISTIE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 775 (3d ed. 1997).
In many jurisdictions, the typical two-year tort statute of limitations is a clock that starts
running on the date of “injury” or “occurrence.” If “occurrence” could be understood to
mean the date of exposure, or if “injury” could be interpreted as the first time when the
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However, after the case has been litigated and resolved, the plaintiff may suffer
further damages. The plaintiffs may be barred from seeking damages from an
injury that occurred as a result of the previously litigated incident.273 Given
the changes that have occurred because of tort reform, the use of tort law may
be a limited solution to the problem of the inequitable placement of
environmental hazards.274
Nonetheless, implementation of the proposed environmental tort would
give the minority community another weapon to fight the disproportionate
placement of environmental hazards in their neighborhoods. Given the lack of
success plaintiffs have had utilizing the Equal Protection Clause, the
availability of a tort cause of action would be a welcomed addition to the legal
landscape.
2.

Modification of the Intent Requirement (Changing the Bathwater)

a.

Cultural Meaning Theory275

According to Professor Charles Lawrence, unconscious racism results
because “Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which
racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared
experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that
attach significance to an individual’s race and induce negative feelings and
opinions about nonwhites.”276 Professor Lawrence proposes replacing the
discriminatory intent requirement with a cultural meaning test that focuses
upon unconscious racism.277 In applying the test, courts would look to see if

toxic substance begins to have any physiological effects, then the plaintiff might find that
the clock has run out by the time she actually contracts the disease.
Id.
273. See CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 272, at 775 (“Under traditional tort rules, a plaintiff
may not ‘split’ her claim and later seek future damages in a different suit. Rather, she must bring
her suit within the statute of limitations, and then seek in that suit all damages flowing from that
injury.”).
274. See generally Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children,
and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004) (discussing the damage caps established under new
tort reform measures). See also CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 272, at 904–17.
275. In his 1994 article, Marco Masoni, then a student at Georgetown University Law Center,
applied the cultural meaning test to an environmental discrimination case. As the result of his
analysis, Masoni concluded that “[t]he cultural meaning test forces one to take a hard look at a
case and, if necessary, probe beneath the apparent neutrality of decisions which
disproportionately impact minorities.” Marco Masoni, The Green Badge of Slavery, 2 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POVERTY 97, 113 (1994).
276. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 322.
277. Id. at 355–62.
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the governmental action conveyed a symbolic message to which the culture
attaches racial significance.278
As a part of that analysis, the court would consider evidence regarding the
historical and social context in which the decision was made and
implemented.279 If, based upon that review, the court decides by a
preponderance of the evidence that a significant portion of the population
would think of the governmental action in racial terms, the court would
presume that “socially shared, unconscious racial attitudes made evident by the
action’s meaning had influenced the decisionmakers.”280 As a consequence,
the court would infer discriminatory intent and apply heightened scrutiny.281
To illustrate his theory, Professor Lawrence gave the example of a
government decision to construct a wall between white and black
communities.282 According to Professor Lawrence, the construction of the
wall would have a “cultural meaning growing out of a long history of whites’
need to separate themselves from blacks as a symbol of their superiority.”283
Since the construction of the wall would conjure up racial inferiority, it would
burden blacks living in the affected communities and reinforce a system of
racial discrimination.284 Therefore, the blacks in those communities should not
have to prove discriminatory intent in order to get judicial redress because the
court should assume that the decision to construct the wall was based upon
race.285
This test could provide some salvation for persons trying to combat
environmental discrimination. In order to get around the discriminatory intent
requirement, the plaintiff would have to prove that the decision to place the
environmental hazard in a minority neighborhood had a cultural meaning that
was based upon the race of the persons living in the impacted area. The
placement of an environmental hazard in a minority neighborhood could have
a cultural meaning growing out of a long history of whites’ beliefs that
minority neighborhoods are not fit for anything other than dumping.286 In
addition, the placement of environmental hazards in a predominately minority

278. Id. at 356.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 356.
282. Id. at 357.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 358.
285. See id. at 356–58.
286. See BULLARD, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing the fact that toxic dumps and other locally
unwanted land uses (LULUs) have historically been placed in minority and low-income
communities).
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neighborhood may further promote the opinion that minorities are “second
class” citizens who do not deserve to live in clean, safe neighborhoods.287
The cultural meaning test may impose a heavy burden on the plaintiff. In
some situations, that burden may be just as arduous as the one environmental
discrimination plaintiffs currently face when trying to prove discriminatory
intent. The burden of proof will be difficult to meet because the cultural
meaning test employs a subjective standard.288 A person’s background and life
experiences will impact the meaning that he or she gives to a particular action.
In the environmental arena, the negative cultural meaning that is attached to a
placement decision will not be as apparent as in segregation cases. Therefore,
in order to prove the cultural meaning attached to a particular placement
decision, the plaintiff would have to acquire the services of an expert such as a
cultural anthropologist. Low-income persons and minorities usually do not
have the financial resources to hire expert witnesses. In addition, since cultural
anthropology is not an exact science, the case may be complicated by a battle
of expert witnesses. Another concern is that the cultural meaning test may be
considered vague and speculative because it does not state the objective
parameters that are necessary to prove cultural meaning.
Ultimately, the cultural meaning test is preferable to the current method of
determining intent in environmental discrimination cases. Application of the
cultural meaning test will allow the court to expose unconscious racism. The
cultural meaning test may also be used as a tool for educating decision-makers
about unconscious racism. Most decision-makers may be unaware that their
underlying biases are influencing the choices they make in their official
capacities. Acknowledgment of the cultural meaning phenomenon may lead
decision-makers to take steps to make the process more inclusive. Initially, it
may be difficult to attach cultural meaning to government actions, however,
after a few cases, the necessary data will be available for use by future
plaintiffs.
b.

Reversing the Groups Theory

Professor David Strauss proposes what he calls a “reversing the groups”
test.289 The test would be used to define what discriminatory intent means.
Under the test, courts would ask the following question: Would the
government actor have made the same decision if he had known that the
challenged governmental action would have adversely impacted whites instead

287. See id. (citing Robert Bullard & Beverly Hendrix Wright, Environmentalism and the
Politics of Equity: Emergent Trends in the Black Community, 12 MID-AM. REV. OF SOC. 21, 28
(1987), and emphasizing that the disdain for minorities led to the “Place in Blacks’ Back Yard”
(PIBBY) principle).
288. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 355–56.
289. Strauss, supra note 218, at 956–59.
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of blacks?290 Another way to put the question is: Would the government have
made a decision that negatively affected the plaintiffs if they were members of
a different race? If the answer to the question is no, the court should decide
that the decision was made with discriminatory intent.291
If this test is applied to an environmental discrimination case, courts would
ask: Would the government actor have decided to place the environmental
hazard in the community if the population of the community was
predominately white? In order to meet his or her burden of proof under this
test, the environmental discrimination plaintiff would have to show that the
decision-maker chose to place the hazard in a minority neighborhood even
though there was a non-minority neighborhood suitable for the project.
Application of this test would have been helpful to the plaintiffs in the East
Bibb case because they had evidence that the county had previously refused to
site the landfill in a predominately white neighborhood.292 The shortcoming of
the proposed test is the fact that the court may not be able to determine the true
answer to the question because the government actors can always come up
with a non-discriminatory reason for environmental placement decisions.
Like under the current intent requirement, the “reversing the groups” test
will place the plaintiff in the difficult position of attempting to attribute a
single motive to a group of people. Nonetheless, the “reversing the groups”
theory will force decision-makers to at least consider non-minority areas when
they are making placement decisions. Having to answer the question posed by
this theory in court may be an incentive for decision-makers to consider factors
other than race when selecting locations for environmental hazards.
3.

My Fair Share Theory

The cement that holds our society together is the belief that the foundation
of our society is justice.293 True justice cannot be achieved if burdens are
placed on a few persons in order to benefit the majority of the population.294 I
arrived at my theory by relying on the readings of John Rawls. In A Theory of

290. Id. at 956–57.
291. Id. at 957.
292. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning
Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 884 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
293. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls states, “[A] society is well-ordered when it is not only
designed to advance the good of its members but when it is also effectively regulated by a public
conception of justice.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4 (rev. ed., The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press 1999) (1971).
294. Id. at 3.
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Justice, John Rawls characterizes justice as fairness.295 Hence, a society
cannot be just without a concept of fairness.296 According to Rawls:
[A] person is required to do his part as defined by the rules of an institution297
when two conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or fair), that is, it
satisfies the two principles of justice;298 and second, one has voluntarily
accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the
opportunities it offers to further one’s interests.299

Rawls explains that, in a situation where a group of persons are
cooperating to achieve a goal, all of the persons should make sacrifices,
including restricting their liberties, to benefit the group as a whole. In that
circumstance, the members of the group will be equally burdened and equally
benefited.300 Rawls concludes, “We are not to gain from the cooperative
labors of others without doing our fair share.”301 In the land use context, the
concept of fair share developed as a potential solution to exclusionary
zoning.302 In addressing the issue of exclusionary zoning, one court
determined that each community has an obligation to take its “fair share” of
low-income persons.303 In the environmental law context, each community has
the responsibility to take its fair share of the environmental hazards located in
the area.304

295. Id. at 10.
296. Id. at 11. Rawls states that the theory of “‘justice as fairness’ . . . conveys the idea that
the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.” Id.
297. Rawls refers to an institution as “a public system of rules which defines offices and
positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like.” Id. at 47.
298. The two principles of justice for institutions are the following:
FIRST PRINCIPLE
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
SECOND PRINCIPLE
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings
principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.
RAWLS, supra note 293, at 266.
299. Id. at 96.
300. Id. (citing H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 185f (1955)).
301. Id. at 96.
302. “Exclusionary zoning” refers to the practice of closing an entire community to unwanted
groups such as low-income and minority persons. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of
Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1870 (1994).
303. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724–25 (N.J.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
304. When discussing “fair treatment,” the Environmental Protection Agency states that “no
group of people, including racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group should bear a disproportionate
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Because it is the antithesis of fairness, discrimination is a termite that eats
at the foundation of society. Therefore, in order for our society to remain
intact, all forms of discrimination must be exterminated. The Equal Protection
Clause was enacted to eliminate discrimination by not allowing similarly
situated persons to be treated differently.305 Consequently, the quest for justice
should be the desire of all courts, especially when reviewing an allegation of
discrimination.
In the United States, it is clear that environmental hazards are not
distributed equally.306 Under the current system, the facilities needed to
provide services for the entire community are usually placed in areas
containing populations that are mostly low-income and minority.307 Thus,
low-income and minority persons bear the burden of environmental pollution
while the majority of the population receives the benefits provided by the
pollution producing facilities.308 Despite recognition of the fact that lowincome and minority persons are disproportionately impacted by
environmental pollution, persons seeking a remedy in an environmental
discrimination case have to overcome a big hurdle—proving discriminatory
intent.309 They must prove that the government actors who made the decision
to place the environmental hazard in their community were motivated by
discriminatory intent.310

share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and
commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, local, and tribal programs and policies.”
Suzanne Smith, Note, Current Treatment of Environmental Justice Claims: Plaintiffs Face a
Dead End in the Courtroom, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 223, 223 (2002) (quoting EPA, INTERIM
FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN EPA’S NEPA
COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS 2 (1997)).
305. See Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
306. See Mohai & Bryant, supra note 27, at 921–22.
307. For example, in New York State, “communities with a minority population of at least 70
percent have about 18 percent of the state’s air pollution sites but only make up about .5 percent
of the land area.” Danita Chambers, Pollution High Where Income Is Low, TIMES UNION, Mar.
12, 2004, at B3; see also Jay Rey, Watchdog Group Accuses State of Environmental Racism, THE
BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 12, 2004, at B22 (discussing the fact that in New York State, members of
“minority communities are exposed to a disproportionate amount of air pollution . . . .”).
308. See Harvey L. White, Race, Class, and Environmental Hazards, in ENVIRONMENTAL
INJUSTICES, POLITICAL STRUGGLES 65, 67 (David E. Camacho ed., 1998) (stating that “in
Detroit, a person of color’s chance of living within a mile of a hazardous waste facility is four
times greater than a white American’s”).
309. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1991); see also Luke W.
Cole & Shelia R. Foster, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF
THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 64 (2001).
310. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning
Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 884 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
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The discriminatory intent requirement is such a high standard that it flies in
the face of fairness and prevents plaintiffs in environmental discrimination
cases from receiving justice. Nonetheless, I am not proposing that the
discriminatory intent requirement be replaced with a different standard. A
legal standard should not be thrown out simply because it is applied in a
manner that disadvantages one side. I am proposing that the courts change the
manner in which they evaluate whether or not the plaintiff has proven
discriminatory intent.
A disparate impact standard would tilt the table too heavily in favor of the
plaintiffs in environmental discrimination cases. It is usually pretty easy to
prove disparate impact because it is well documented that minorities are
disproportionately impacted by environmental hazards.311 Disparate impact
usually becomes a problem when the community feels the cumulative impact
of several environmental hazards. Thus, application of a disparate impact
standard would require current decision-makers to be held accountable for the
actions of their predecessors.312
Current decision-makers should not be held responsible for past decisions
to place environmental hazards unless they acted with knowledge that their
placement decision would make the situation worse. A person should only be
held liable if there is some level of culpability on his or her part. In order to be
held liable under the Equal Protection Clause, the persons who made the
challenged decision should have some actual knowledge or attributable
knowledge of the harm their action would cause to persons living in the
impacted neighborhood. On the other hand, strict application of the
discriminatory intent standard places an onerous burden on the environmental
discrimination plaintiff and advantages the decision-maker.313
The intent standard should be maintained to avoid holding persons liable
for harms they did not intend to cause. Nonetheless, intent should be defined
broadly enough to encompass both conscious and unconscious racism.314 The
underlying basis of my proposal is fairness315 and social cooperation.316
311. See Centner et al., supra note 32, at 127–28.
312. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 320.
313. See Mitchell A. Horwich, Comment, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the
Closing of a Public Hospital, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1033, 1043–45 (1981).
314. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 324–25.
315. See RAWLS, supra note 293, at 301–08 (discussing why fairness is of great importance in
a just society).
316. See John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND
LAW 2, 14 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1987).
The notion of social cooperation is not simply that of coordinated social activity
efficiently organized and guided by publicly recognized rules to achieve some overall
end. Social cooperation is always for mutual benefit and this implies that it involves two
elements: the first is a shared notion of fair terms of cooperation, which each participant
may reasonably be expected to accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them.
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Fairness should play a part in any equal protection analysis because the
amendment was enacted to address the issue of inequality.317
For years, the United States was segregated on the basis of race and class.
Persons relied on the Equal Protection clause to remedy the harms caused by
segregation.318 Currently, a significant number of minority persons are being
segregated in neighborhoods that are plagued with environmental hazards.319
Those persons should be able to more readily avail themselves of the
safeguards afforded by the Equal Protection Clause.
Currently, the courts rely on the Arlington Heights factors to determine if
the plaintiffs have made a prima facie case of discriminatory intent.320 As a
result, the courts refuse to apply strict scrutiny unless the plaintiff proves that
discriminatory intent was the motivating factor behind the government
action.321 It is my contention that fairness dictates that courts evaluate the
reasonableness322 of the decision to place the environmental hazard in a certain

Fair terms of cooperation articulate an idea of reciprocity and mutuality: all who
cooperate must benefit, or share in common burdens, in some appropriate fashion judged
by a suitable benchmark of comparison.
Id.
317. See Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV.
1, 8 (2000) (claiming that the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the government
demonstrates equal concern for all citizens); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
(1976) (stating that “[t]he central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race”); Jay S.
Bybee, The Equal Process Clause: A Note on the (Non)Relationship Between Romer v. Evans
and Hunter v. Erickson, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 201, 205 (1997); Jeanmarie K. Grubert,
Note, The Rehnquist Court’s Changed Reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the Context of
Voting Rights, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1843–44 (1997).
318. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“[T]he plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); see also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (holding that a city which
closed public swimming pools rather than try to operate them as desegregated did not deny equal
protection).
319. Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 3, 11 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994)
(stating that “[n]umerous studies[,] dating back to the 1970s, reveal that communities of color
have borne greater health and environmental risk burdens than has society at large”); see also
White, supra note 308, at 68–69 (discussing the national pattern of low-income and minorities
being disproportionately exposed to environmental hazards).
320. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977);
see also Johnson v. Bd. of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 2d 944, 970 (C.D. Ill. 2002).
321. See, e.g., Anderson ex rel. Dowd v. City of Boston, 375 F.3d 71, 82 (1st Cir. 2004).
322. According to John Rawls,
[R]easonable persons are characterized in two ways: First, they stand ready to offer fair
terms of social cooperation between equals, and they abide by these terms if others do
also, even should it be to their advantage not to; second, reasonable persons recognize and
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area when deciding the issue of discriminatory intent. To equalize the process,
the courts should apply an objective reasonableness test to determine if the
decision-maker may have been motivated by the intent to discriminate. If the
plaintiffs are able to show that the decision to place the environmental hazard
in their neighborhood was presumptively unreasonable, the burden should shift
to the decision-makers to prove that they were not motivated by discriminatory
intent.
Under the test I propose, like in the current system, the initial burden of
proof would be on the plaintiff to prove the placement decision has a disparate
impact on a community predominately populated by persons from one racial or
ethic group.323 The next step would be for the court to ask the following
question: Was it reasonable to place the environmental hazard in the plaintiff’s
neighborhood? In answering the question, the court would start with the
premise that it is unreasonable to place an environmental hazard in an area that
is already oversaturated with environmental hazards. The plaintiff has the
burden of proving that his/her neighborhood was oversaturated when the
government actor made the decision to place the new environmental hazard in
the area. In order to show over-saturation, the plaintiff must present evidence
indicating the percentage of the community that lives in the impacted area.
Then, the plaintiff must show the percentage of the community’s
environmental hazards324 that are located in the area. If the plaintiff proves
that, prior to the placement decision, the percentage of the hazards bore by
his/her neighborhood was significantly higher than the percentage of the
community’s population living in the neighborhood, he/she has proven
oversaturation. For example, if the impacted neighborhood makes up twenty
percent of the community’s population and contains sixty-five percent of the
environmental hazards located in the community, a court should consider the
area to be oversaturated. An alternative method for determining oversaturation
may be to focus on the level of pollution in the impacted community. This
would cover the cases where a community with fewer environmental hazards
has more pollution. For instance, a community with two chemical plants may
be more polluted than a community with four landfills.
Once an area is classified as being oversaturated, there should be a
presumption it is unreasonable to place another environmental hazard in the
area. Courts should presume that an unreasonable placement decision was
accept the consequences of the burdens of judgment, which leads to the idea of reasonable
toleration in a democratic society.
JOHN RAWLS, THE LAWS OF PEOPLES 177 (1999) (citations omitted). Based upon Rawls’s
observations, it is my contention that reasonable persons make reasonable decisions that are fair.
Thus, the actions of decision-makers should be evaluated using a reasonableness standard.
323. See United States v. Hare, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 991–92 (D. Neb. 2004).
324. Environmental hazards should be broadly defined to include businesses like gas stations
and salvage yards that require government permission to operate in a certain area.
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motivated by discriminatory intent. In order for a court to make the
presumption, the plaintiff must prove that the decision-maker knew or should
have known about the racial make-up and the over-saturation of the selected
area. Finally, the decision-makers will have the opportunity to rebut the
presumption. The decision-makers may be able to rebut the presumption by
proving that the placement of the new hazard in the community did not make
the level of pollution in the area any worse. To prove this point, the decisionmakers will have to rely upon objective scientific and statistical data.
The fair share test is not a cure-all for environmental discrimination
plaintiffs. It still requires them to obtain and submit large volumes of
information. However, the information is easily acquired through discovery,
investigative techniques, and public hearings. Further, the test only focuses
upon the placement of additional environmental hazards and does not provide a
mechanism for removing hazards from minority communities. Nonetheless,
the fair share theory is a step towards easing the burdens on minorities.
CONCLUSION
The discriminatory intent requirement has caused problems for plaintiffs in
environmental discrimination cases. Nonetheless, the requirement of intent for
proving discrimination has not lost its usefulness. Hence, the intent
requirement should not be discarded as the foundation of an equal protection
case. Instead courts should change the manner in which they apply the intent
standard. Presently, courts look for evidence of purposeful, conscious intent to
discriminate when deciding if a government actor has violated the Equal
Protection Clause in siting an environmental hazard. Courts should view
“intent” through a broader lens in order to identify situations where the
government action was motivated by an unconscious intent to discriminate on
the part of the decision-maker.
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